Understanding Brexit at a local level: causes of discontent and asymmetric impacts by Olivas-Osuna, Jose Javier et al.
UNDERSTANDING  
BREXIT AT A LOCAL 
LEVEL: CAUSES OF 
DISCONTENT AND 
ASYMMETRIC  
IMPACTS
CONFLICT AND CIVIL  
SOCIETY RESEARCH UNIT
MARCH 2019
Supported by the LSE
Knowledge Exchange and Impact fund
José Javier Olivas Osuna
Josh de Lyon
Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni
Alexandra Bulat
Max Kiefel
Diane Bolet
Kuba Jablonowski
Mary Kaldor
Front cover: Pexels
Summary of the project and its objectives
The UK is in a critical juncture with regard to the process of negotiations to leave the European 
Union. Important discussions are taking place which will shape the future relation between 
Britain and the EU. The economic analyses published on the issue have, so far, largely failed to 
grasp the attention of the general public. Most of the discussions about Brexit have focused 
at a national level and there has been very little evidence-based discussion at a local level. 
This project aims at stimulating a reflexive participatory research process involving citizens, 
policy-makers, business people and civil-society representatives. It introduces an innovative 
methodology that contextualises quantitative data through expert interviews and the analysis 
of local sources. The reports and discussion panels organised within the framework of the 
project seek to increase our understanding about the impact of Brexit at a local level.
B
This study focuses on the perceived impact of Brexit on British local 
authorities. Five local authority case studies have been selected: 
Mansfield, Pendle, Ceredigion, Southampton and Barnet. It has been 
co-ordinated by the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level 
Case studies
MANSFIELD
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SOUTHAMPTON
PENDLE
CEREDIGON
THE LONDON  
BOROUGH OF 
BARNET
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 This report analyses the vote in the 2016 European 
Union (EU) membership referendum and the predicted 
impacts of leaving the EU based on the analysis of five 
local authority areas in England and Wales: Barnet, 
Ceredigion, Mansfield, Pendle and Southampton. 
• Rational economic calculations have not weighed as 
much in the Brexit vote as discontent and emotions. 
The most important causes for the Leave vote, such 
as dissatisfaction with globalisation, migration and the 
perceived threats to identity, are to a large extent rooted 
in local socio-economic and geographic features.
• Structural local problems, such as scarcity of highly 
skilled jobs, lack of investment and casualisation 
of work, have contributed to create ‘geographies of 
discontent,’ especially in zones where regeneration 
policies have failed. 
• Some segments of the population felt ‘left behind’ 
by the ‘elites’ and believed that their interests were 
undermined by international economic and cultural 
trends which they associate with EU membership.
• At the cultural level, the Leave vote reflects a reaction 
against change and the preservation of identity; 
meanwhile, at the material level, it primarily manifests 
a will to transform the current socio-economic path. 
• The overall impact of Brexit on the economy is 
expected be negative according to most interviewees 
as well as most academic and government studies. But 
this impact is going to be largely asymmetric. Some 
regions and economic sectors are likely to suffer more 
than others. These are the problems that emerged 
more often in our fieldwork:
 1. Disruption in the import and export flows due 
to the introduction of tariffs will greatly affect 
aeronautical and automotive industries. The UK 
is expected to protect existing trade links with the 
EU to prevent relocation of economic activity and 
job losses.
 2. The controls on immigration will likely aggravate 
the problem of skills shortages in key areas such as 
health services, technology and higher education. 
There is a need to address the mismatch between 
skills demand and supply in the UK which has 
been compensated via migrant workers so far. 
Shortages of low-skilled workers are also feared 
especially in food factories, warehouses, fruit picking 
and cleaning. 
 3. The loss of European funding and payments may 
very negatively affect British farming and R&D, as 
well as regional and local economic development 
in areas which suffered industrial restructuring. 
Although the UK Government has expressed a 
firm intention to match the lost funding, problems 
concerning the replacement of regulation, timing 
and criteria for the calculation of funding may 
generate new ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
• Uncertainty is affecting both the economy and 
governance. Many of the required policies to mitigate 
the problems above have not been clearly defined yet. 
The relative optimism observed in the aftermath of the 
referendum has vanished and been replaced with a 
general sense of anxiety in the business community.
• Many of the problems underpinning the Leave vote 
are likely not going to be solved simply by leaving 
the EU. Some of them may even be exacerbated. In 
order to reduce discontent associated with low social 
mobility, casualisation of work, stagnant paths of local 
economic development and the relative economic and 
political insularity of certain areas, additional policies 
are required. 
• Participants in our discussion panels agree that 
investments in infrastructures (roads and trains) to 
improve access, as well as in education and vocational 
training to address the mismatch between skills 
demand and supply, are necessary to make these areas 
more appealing for business.
• Moreover, it is necessary that both London and 
Brussels pay more attention to the local realities, and 
in particular to those areas which are further away 
from the great political and economic hubs. Local 
empowerment and more political decentralisation may 
be necessary to reduce some of the frustration which 
fuelled the Leave movement. 
Executive summary
Introduction
This report synthetises the findings of the research project Debating Brexit at 
a Local Level: a mixed methods comparative study,1 which sheds light on the 
specific reasons underpinning the referendum result in different local areas, and 
how Brexit may affect their citizens. 
1 More information about the project and research team available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-civil-society/current-projects/
debating-brexit-at-a-local-level. 
2 Murray I. Plagnol A. and Corr P. 2017. ‘When things go wrong and people are afraid’: An evaluation of group polarisation in the UK post Brexit. SSRN. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3041846 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3041846. 
3 The Policy Institute at King’s College, The UK in a Changing Europe and Ipsos MORI. 2018. Brexit misperceptions. October. Available at:  
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/publications/brexit-misperceptions.pdf. 
4 Clarke J. and Newman J. 2017. ‘People in this country have had enough of experts’: Brexit and the paradoxes of populism. Critical Policy Studies, 11(1), pp 101-116, 110-111.
5 Paul M. 2017. Brexit: a chance for universities to leave their ivory towers behind. Times Higher Education. 28 March. Available at: https://www.timeshighereducation.
com/blog/brexit-chance-universities-leave-their-ivory-towers-behind. Note that overall trust in scientist has followed a growing trend since the 1990s. Bauer M. W. 
2017. No time for experts? Trust in science after the BREXIT vote of 23 June 2016. In: Schiele B. and LeMarec J. (Eds.) Cultures de Science. Montreal: Acfas, pp. 91-99. 
6 Bulat A. et al. 2018. Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level:  The London Borough of Barnet case study. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90230/. 
7 Jablonowski K. et al. 2018. Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level:  Ceredigion case study. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90387/. 
8	 Gartzou-Katsouyanni	K.	et	al.	2018.	Understanding	Brexit	impacts	at	a	local	level:		Mansfield	case	study.	Available	at:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90393/. 
9 Kiefel M. et al. 2018. Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level:  Pendle case study. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90324/. 
10 Bolet D. et al. 2018. Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level:  Southampton case study. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90386/. 
11 The main factors considered to shortlist these cases were: results of the General Elections in 2015 and 2017; result of the European membership vote in the 2016 
referendum; employment share per sector; percentage of non-British residents; and percentage of residents and of those born in other EU countries. See appendix.
12 The 2016 ONS migration data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom. 
13 See Appendix 1, page 20-21.
The 2016 UK EU membership referendum has not only 
contributed to revealing, and arguably exacerbating, 
significant	levels	of	political	polarisation	in	Britain,2 but also 
the inability of social scientists to influence authoritatively 
political debates. Research evidence has not been a decisive 
factor shaping either public views or political choices on 
the issue. Misperceptions on the issue of Brexit concerning 
migration and economic exchanges with the EU have been 
pervasive.3 Distrust of data and experts has been fuelled by 
some politicians and popular media,4 but it is also the result 
of the lack of direct engagement with local communities and 
the wider public.5 This project has tried to address this issue 
by paying closer attention to what Brexit means to ordinary 
citizens and adopting a reflexive participatory approach 
involving citizens, policy-makers, business people and civil-
society representatives. It contextualises existing academic 
explanations and predictions about Brexit at a local level.  
This report is the result of the analysis of local sources  
and the discussion with local stakeholders of the core 
arguments on the causes and consequences of Brexit 
suggested in the literature.
 
Five local authority areas were chosen: Barnet,6 Ceredigion,7 
Mansfield,8 Pendle9 and Southampton.10 These case studies 
were selected following a cross-examination of data from 
the	Electoral	Commission,	Office	of	National	Statistics	(ONS),	
Business Register and Employment Survey, Annual Population 
Survey and Census.11 These areas were found to be illustrative 
of different results in the Brexit referendum and General 
Elections, as well as a variety of potential socio-economic 
realities. For instance, Barnet and Ceredigion voted Remain, 
while	Pendle,	Mansfield	and	Southampton	voted	Leave.		In	
Mansfield	Conservatives	significantly	improved	their	results	in	
the 2017 General Election, while in Southampton and Pendle 
Labour gained vote share vis-à-vis the 2015 General Election. 
In Barnet (20.8%) and Southampton (19.7%) there is a high 
proportion of non-British citizens, while in Ceredigion (4%), 
Pendle	(6.7%)	and	Mansfield	(7.6%)	the	migrant	population	
was below the national average (9.3%).12 Some of these 
local authority areas are distinctly urban, such as Barnet 
and Southampton, while others are rural or mixed, such as 
Ceredigion,	Mansfield	and	Pendle.Finally,	this	sample	covers	
areas	with	significant	manufacturing	activity	(Pendle)	or	
a	strong	manufacturing	heritage	(Pendle	and	Mansfield),	
agricultural activity (Ceredigion) and where public services are 
central for the local economy (Barnet and Southampton).13 
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This report argues that the attitudes and perceptions which explain the Leave 
vote, such as the discontent with globalisation, migration and the perceived 
threats to identity, are to a large extent rooted in some local socio-economic and 
geographic structural characteristics. 
While at the ideational level the Leave vote can be interpreted 
as a defensive reaction that seeks to preserve identity and 
culture, from a material socio-economic point of view, this vote 
means the opposite: a disruptive force aiming to truncate the 
current path of economic development and promote change. 
This article also shows that the impacts of Brexit are likely 
going to be primarily negative and largely asymmetric. The 
consequences of the disruption of trade flows, in particular 
of industries with a complex logistic chain, the shortage of 
skilled labour and the problems substituting EU funding and 
payments, are key sources of concerns for local stakeholders 
and seem to offset the opportunities Brexit may create. Political 
and economic uncertainty seems to be precluding clarity at 
the level of post-Brexit governance. Furthermore, it is not clear 
that leaving the EU would help to substantially mitigate the 
problems which are the origin of the discontent motivating 
the Leave vote. Local empowerment and the necessary 
investments for economic regeneration do not seem a  
priority for the Brexit agenda. New ‘losers’ may emerge  
during the process.
globalisation, their attitudes towards migration and their understanding of 
identity, alongside other structural socio-economic and geographical factors, are 
found to largely explain the results in the areas analysed.14 The findings of this 
project corroborate some of the social science analyses in the field. 
14	 The	very	weak	pro-Remain	campaign	by	all	political	parties	in	some	local	areas	such	as	Mansfield	and	Pendle	was	also	suggested	as	an	important	factor	explaining	
the	result	of	the	referendum.	Discussion	panel	in	ACE	Centre	in	Nelson	(Pendle),	22	January	2019;	and	Mansfield	Central	Library,	24	January	2019.
15	 In	the	interviews	and	discussion	panels	in	Mansfield	and	Pendle,	where	there	was	a	large	majority	of	Leave	vote,	there	were	several	references	to	the	existence	of	
a ‘North-South’ divide in the country. See also Watson M. 2018. Brexit, the left behind and the let-down: the political abstraction of ‘the economy’ and the UK’s EU 
referendum. British Politics, 13(1),	pp.	17-30;	Goodwin	M.	and	Heath	O.	2016.	The	2016	Referendum,	Brexit	and	the	left	behind:	An	aggregate‐level	analysis	of	the	result. 
The Political Quarterly, 87(3), pp. 323-332, 331.
16 Curtice J. 2017. Why Leave won the UK’s EU referendum. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55, pp. 19-37; Colantone I. and Stanig P. 2018. Global competition and 
Brexit. American Political Science Review, 112(2, pp. 201-218. Colantone and Stanig show that globalisation affected the vote, in particular areas severely affected by 
the competition of Chinese exports.
17	 In	Pendle,	one	person	argued	that	there	needs	to	be	devolution	to	the	North	of	England	like	in	Wales	so	as	to	draw	political	attention.	And	in	Mansfield,	the	people	who	
participated in the discussions argued that they needed to come together more often so as to come up with local solutions that put pressure on national and European 
institutions. See also Hobolt S. 2016. The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9), pp. 1259-1277.
18 Colantone and Stanig, 202, 215-216.
19	 In	Mansfield,	the	phenomenon	of	immigration	is	relatively	recent,	with	migrants	coming	mainly	from	Eastern	European	countries.	The	percentage	of	non-UK-born	
people in Pendle is very low too, but in our discussion there were many references to the ‘Asian’ population and an existing ethnic divide. In Nelson, where the Pendle 
discussion took place, 40% of the population is Asian according to the 2011 Census. See ONS. 2011. 2011 Census. Available at:  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census
20 Vasilopolou S. 2016. UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum. The Political Quarterly, 87(2), pp. 219-227; Goodwin M. and Milazzo C. 2017. Taking back control? 
Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3), pp. 450-464.
21 Kaufmann E. 2017. Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence Party vote. Electoral Studies, 48, pp. 57-69.
Several experts and citizens interviewed expressed that there 
is a widespread feeling of being ‘abandoned’ or ‘left behind’ by 
the ‘elites’ from London and Brussels, which explains the Leave 
vote in many working-class areas in the UK.  There is a certain 
sense of pessimism, insecurity and disconnect with political 
elites which were considered ‘out of touch’.15 Citizens felt that 
their concerns were not being heard or taken into account 
by most political leaders and that globalisation, which the 
EU somehow represents in the collective imaginary, appears 
to	be	out	of	control	and	does	not	benefit	them.16 The wealth 
generated by trade liberalisation has been distributed highly 
unequally. The ‘losers of globalisation’, the working classes, 
older and less educated people, were more likely to vote Leave. 
Many of them believed that with an EU exit they would recover 
the part of their sovereignty that had been transferred to 
Brussels and that they would somehow ‘take back control’ of 
their own future. The argument about ‘taking back control’ was 
most particularly salient in our interviews. In our discussion 
panels it was clearly expressed that while cities are doing well, 
‘towns are left behind’, and that it was probably necessary to 
achieve a higher degree of political decentralisation so that 
policy-making would take into consideration local realities.17
Although immigration was often mentioned in our interviews 
as a fundamental explanatory variable, this does not seem to 
be a clear predictor of the Leave vote.18 The two areas with 
the highest percentage of Eurosceptic vote in the referendum, 
Mansfield	and	Pendle,	have	a	percentage	of	migrant	population	
significantly	below	the	UK	average.19 In the discussion panels 
conducted in these areas, it was argued that immigration 
was a ‘proxy’ or a ‘red herring’ and that the real motivation 
was the sense of abandonment and neglect from Labour 
and Conservative governments. It is important to distinguish 
between real migration and perceptions of migration. Negative 
attitudes towards migration and increases in the rates of 
immigrants seem to be associated with the Leave vote, but not 
the	overall	size	of	the	migrant	population	in	a	specific	area.20 
Thus, it is not so much about levels but about changes.21 Areas 
with lower total number of migrant residents but which have 
experienced	significant	increases	in	short	periods	of	time	may	
be correlated with more negative views on immigration and be 
more likely to vote Leave. 
Explaining the vote: real structural 
economic problems underpin discontent
The results of our fieldwork in these areas shed some light on the variety of 
reasons underpinning the Leave vote and on the problems that Brexit may 
generate (and is already generating) across the UK. Citizens’ discontent with 
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Table 1: Referendum results and ethnic origin
 Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country
Percentage voting Remain 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
Percentage voting Leave 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
Percentage non-British 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3%
Percentage non UK born 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1%
Percentage born in UK, 2011 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6%
Percentage born in other EU countries, 2011 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
Percentage white UK born 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7%
Percentage white not UK born 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8%
Percentage ethnic minority UK born 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5%
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0%
 
Source: Data from 2011 Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), Electoral Commission and Office for National Statistics
Source: Data from 2011 Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), Electoral Commission and Office for National Statistics
51.9%
 The spinning room of a typical Lancashire cotton mill
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Collective identities and cultural factors emerge as important 
drivers in the context of the Brexit vote.22 Arguably more than 
rational economic considerations,23 migration and globalisation 
are perceived as threats to people’s identity. Interviewees 
and analysts often associate Euroscepticism with English 
nationalism and racism.24 In our discussion panels in Barnet 
and Nelson (Pendle), racism and unease with increasingly 
visible ethnic divides were also associated with Brexit.25 
Meanwhile,	Ceredigion	fieldwork	shows	that	Welsh	nationalism	
was linked, although not uniformly, with the Remain option 
in the referendum. 58% of those who identify themselves as 
both Welsh and British voted Leave. Conversely, only 16% of 
those who are fluent in Welsh and do not identify themselves 
as British, but only Welsh, voted for an EU exit.26 The areas 
of Ceredigion where Leave prevailed coincided with those 
where internal migrants from England usually settle. Welsh 
nationalists from Plaid Cymru do not see the EU as a threat to 
their identity but as a custodian which shields them from the 
dominant English or British ones.27
22 Swales K. 2016. Understanding the Leave vote. NatCen Social Research. Available at: http://natcen.ac.uk/media/1319222/natcen_brexplanations-report-final-web2.pdf. 
23	 Goodwin	M.	2018.	The	perceived	costs	and	benefits	of	Brexit.	In	The UK in a changing Europe (Ed.). Brexit and public opinion, pp. 24-27. Available at:  
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-perceived-costs-and-benefits-of-brexit/; Kaufmann E. 2016. It’s NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal values. LSE British 
Politics and Policy Blog, 7 July. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71585/. 
24 Virdee S. and McGeever B. 2018. Racism, crisis, Brexit. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41(10),pp. 1802-1819.
25 Discussion panels in Pattiserie Joie de Vie, Barnet High Street, 28 September 2018; and ACE Centre, Nelson, 22 January 2019.
26 Wyn Jones R. 2018. Holyhead will be one of the biggest losers from Brexit. Irish Times, 4 January. Available at:  
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/holyhead-will-be-one-of-the-biggest-losers-from-brexit-1.3343977. 
27 Interviews with Alun Williams, Council and Cabinet Member in Ceredigion, 24 May 2018; Elin Jones Welsh AM, 25 May 2018; and Ben Lake MP, 5 June 2018.
28	 Sheffield	Political	Economy	Research	Institute	(SPERI).	2016.	UK	regions	and	UK	structural	and	investment	funds. SPERI British Political Economy Brief , 24. Available 
at: http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Brief24-UK-regions-and-European-structural-and-investment-funds.pdf.   
29 Los B., McCann P., Springford J. and Thissen M. (2017). The mismatch between local voting and the local economic consequences of Brexit. Regional Studies,  
51(5), pp. 786-799, 788, 793.
30	 Several	participants	in	the	discussion	panels	in	Mansfield	and	Pendle	expressed	this	view.	See	also	Martin	R.,	Pike	A.,	Tyler	P.	and	Gardiner	B.	2016.	Spatially	
rebalancing the UK economy: Towards a new policy model? Regional Studies, 50(2), pp. 342-357, 344-346.
31 Rodríguez-Pose A. 2018. The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,  
11(1), pp. 189–209, 190, 206.
Rational	calculations	on	the	future	economic	benefits	or	losses	
associated with Brexit do not seem to have heavily influenced 
voters in the referendum. There is actually a mismatch between 
voting	and	the	predicted	consequences	of	an	EU	exit	in	specific	
geographic areas. Some of the areas which voted Leave are 
among those which are more dependent on the EU and received 
more European funds.28 However, structural local economic 
conditions may have shaped the choices of individuals and given 
rise to a ‘geography of discontent’.29 Regeneration policies failed 
in many towns, in particular in the North of England, creating 
an imbalance between regions.30 In some areas with declining 
or stagnating economic growth, residents are increasingly 
concerned with a perceived lack of opportunities or neglect from 
governments. Not only the ‘left behind’ or ‘losers of globalisation’ 
voted	Leave,	but	many	of	those	who	benefited	from	it	also	did	
partly influenced by the pessimistic interpretations of the local 
socio-economic context which dominated at the ideational level. 
The Leave vote may be construed as a sort of ‘revenge of the 
places that don’t matter’.31
 The spinning room of a typical Lancashire cotton mill
Mansfield	and	Pendle	underwent	a	painful	industrial	
restructuring process following the decline of the mining and 
textile industries. These areas are relatively isolated and they 
struggle to attract skill and investment which tend to favour 
larger cities in the region. Their economies have become 
increasingly more dependent on businesses based on low-
skill and low-paid jobs, such as large distribution warehouses 
for clothing companies.32 Some business practices, such as 
reliance on agency workers on zero-hour contracts, are very 
widespread.33 This economic model and relative geographic 
insularity has hindered social mobility, reduced local youth 
32 Sanders M. 2018. Undercover: Britain’s cheap clothes: Channel 4 Dispatches. Channel 4. 30 January. Available at:  
http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/undercover-britains-cheap-clothes-channel-4-dispatches-mon-30th-jan . 
33 Business, Innovation and Skills Committee. 2016. Employment practices at Sports Dir;ect. Third Report of the Session 2016-2017. House of Commons, HC 219. 22 
July, 27. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf. 
34 Jennings W. 2017. Cities and towns: The 2017 general election and the social divisions of place: Part I. New Economics Foundation. October. Available at:  
https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/FINAL-CITIES-AND-TOWNS.pdf.
35 The lower the position in the ranking, the higher the mobility.
expectations and strengthen the sense of being ‘left behind’ 
in certain towns.34 Migrant workers from Eastern Europe are 
also perceived by some locals as an aggravating factor which 
contributes to pull down wages. Many believed that Brexit could 
contribute to break these economic inertias which seemed to 
have	locked	Pendle	and	Mansfield	on	a	stagnating	path.	It	is	
interesting to note that the responsibility of UK governments in 
promoting these criticised models of economic development 
as well as the positive effects of EU membership for  
these areas did not occupy a prominent position in Brexit  
public discussions.
Table 2: Education, Social Mobility and Leave vote  
 Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, aged 16-64 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4%
Percentage with no qualifications, aged 16-64 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0%
Social Mobility Index 2017 (ranking out of 324)35 9 Not available  in Wales 315 144 247 Not applicable
Median gross weekly earnings (Full-time) £580 £468 £454 £551 £571 £569
Percentage voting Leave in Brexit referendum 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
 
Source: Data from Annual Population Survey (APS), Social Mobility Commission, Office for National Statistics, and Electoral Commission.Social Mobility Index only available 
for England. 
 ‘Mighty Mansfield: Leaders of Europe in thin seam working’, miners at Mansfield Colliery, 1987
 Port of Southampton
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In Southampton, the rapid influx of migrant population 
and the approach to local economic development, which 
prioritised the rebranding of the city centre over providing basic 
needs to local populations, contributed to dissatisfaction.36 
Geographic location also influenced attitudes towards Brexit 
in Southampton. There was a widespread belief that thanks to 
its highly important port, which is the biggest export port and 
number one vehicle handling port in the UK,37 they would avoid 
most negative consequences of Brexit. This shared perception 
on the structural advantages the port provides to Southampton 
may have made some voters back the exit option, and forget 
that a large share of the exports and passengers that use the 
port come or go to other EU member states.
Overall, the outcome of the Brexit referendum in the areas 
studied is the result of the interplay of ideational (discontent, 
prejudices, perceptions) and structural factors (stagnating 
local economies, geographic features). On the one hand, 
the Leave vote may be construed as a reaction against the 
political elites and the notions of globalisation and migration 
which are perceived to threaten pre-existing identities and 
create a widespread sense of being ‘left behind’. Somehow 
the EU is mostly associated in the British collective imaginary 
36 Adams R. 2016. ‘Multi-million pound plans to transform Bargate centre in Southampton revealed. The Southern Daily Echo. 20 May. Available at: https://www.dailyecho.
co.uk/business/14505263.Revealed__Get_a_glimpse_of_multi-million_pound_plans_to_transform_Bargate_Centre/. Interview with Councillor Andrew Pope, 6 June 2018.
37 Its ports handle £40 billion worth of exports, including 820,000 vehicles every year. Institute of Export & International Trade. 2017. Southampton Port set for record 
export year. Available at: https://www.export.org.uk/news/354558/Southampton-Port-set-for-record-export-year.htm. Associated British Ports. 2018. Port Information 
Southampton. Available at: http://www.southamptonvts.co.uk/Port_Information/ 
with the negative effects of globalisation. On the other hand, 
Euroscepticism has been fuelled by the dissatisfaction with 
real socio-economic trends and local models of development 
and with the limited decision-making power at the local level. 
People felt that their concerns were not heard. The Brexit vote 
for many was an opportunity for change and a way to restore 
in the local community a sense of pride and ownership lost 
through the process of globalisation. The much repeated 
slogan ‘take back control’ captures this idea. Therefore, while 
at the ideational level the Brexit vote reflects a will to preserve 
the status quo at the level of identity, at the material level Leave 
primarily manifests a will to transform a socio-economic trend 
and political reality which is perceived as unsatisfactory. 
 Port of Southampton
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Impacts of Brexit: few winners, many losers
One of the main outcomes of the fieldwork of this research project is the 
confirmation than Brexit is likely going to generate asymmetric, and mostly 
negative, impacts across different economic sectors and parts of the UK. Even if 
many business people were fairly optimistic about the economic prospects until 
mid-2018, ever since there has been a drastic shift in perceptions associated with 
the uncertainty generated by Brexit.38 Since the 2016 referendum, substantial 
quantitative research has been undertaken on the socio-economic impact of 
Brexit. Most economic studies predict that Brexit will be overall negative, in 
particular for the UK, and more so if there is a ‘hard’ exit scenario. 
38	 Richard	Crisp,	Commercial	Development	Executive,	Mansfield	Building	Society,	during	our	discussion	panel	in	Mansfield,	24	January	2019.	See	also	Deloitte.	2019.	The	
Deloitte CF Survey Q42018. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/finance/deloitte-uk-cfo-survey-report-q4-2018.pdf.  
ICAEW.	2019.	ICAEW	UK	Business	Confidence	Monitor	Q1	2009.	Available	at:	https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/economy/business-
confidence-monitor/icaew-bcm-q1-2019.ashx.
39 CEP. 2018. The economic consequences of the Brexit deal. The UK in a Changing Europe report, 27 November. Available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/new-research-shows-
economic-and-fiscal-consequences-of-the-brexit-deal/, 5. Estimates based on global trade models.
40 HM Government. 2018. EU exit: Long-term economic analysis. November, Cm 9741. Available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759762/28_November_EU_Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis.pdf. 
41 Only some regions in the Republic of Ireland face exposure levels similar to those of the UK. Chen W., Los B., McCann P., Ortega-Argiles, R., Thissen M. and van Oort F. 
2018. The continental divide? Economic exposure to Brexit in regions and countries on both sides of the channel. Papers in Regional Science, 97(1), pp. 25-54, 33-37.
42 Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy D. and Sampson, T. 2017. The Brexit Vote, Inflation and UK Living Standards. CEP Brexit series. Paper No. 11, pp. 13-14. Available at  
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit11.pdf.
43 Clarke S., Serwicka I. and Winters L.A. 2017. Changing lanes: The impact of different post-Brexit trading policies on the cost of living. Resolution Foundation UK Trade 
Policy Observatory Report. Available at: http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/10/Changing-Lanes.pdf, 6-7. 
44 Dhingra, S., Machin S. and Overman H. G. 2017a. The local economic effects of Brexit. See Appendix 2. CEP Brexit series, Paper No. 10. Available at:  
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf, 11.
45 Dhingra S., Ottaviano G., Rappoport V., Sampson T. and Thomas C. 2017b. UK trade and FDI: A post-Brexit perspective. CEP Discussion Paper, No 1487. Available at: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1487.pdf, 14.
46 BBC News. 2018. Airbus warns no-deal Brexit could see it leave UK. 22 June. available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44570931.  
Business Leader. 2019. Brexit warnings by Airbus and Siemens cannot be ignored. Guardian. 27 January. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jan/27/airbus-siemens-brexit-warnings.
A study by LSE Centre for Economic Performance (CEP), 
King’s College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
estimates that, on a ten-year period, leaving the EU may lead to 
a reduction of UK per capita GDP of 1.9% to 8.7% depending on 
the conditions of the exit.39 According to a cross-departmental 
analysis by HM Government, the accumulated impact after 15 
years would range from 3.9% to 9.3%, in case of no deal, of the 
total GDP.40 Chen et al. argue that the UK’s exposure to Brexit is 
4.6 times greater than that of the rest of the EU as a whole.41 
However, in addition to these overall impacts, it is necessary 
to pay attention to the important asymmetries of the 
effects at regional and local levels, which may have relevant 
implications in terms of governance. Breinlich et al. show a 
loss in purchasing power due to inflation which hits harder in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.42 Clarke et al. analyse 
tariffs and conclude that London and South East England will 
be less affected than other parts of the UK and predict that 
up to 13% of employees in the North and the Midlands could 
be affected by changes in tariffs.43 Conversely, based on trade 
figures	and	a	sectoral	analysis	at	local	level,	Dhingra	et	al.	
predict that in both a ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit scenarios the South 
of England and urban areas will be hit harder.44 Redistribution 
policies at regional level may become more necessary after 
Brexit.45	In	addition,	scholars	have	addressed	specific	themes,	
such as attitudes towards migrants, the impact on the National 
Health	Service	or	the	salience	of	fisheries	policy,	all	of	which	
will likely have unequal impacts across regions and for which 
governance	may	require	geographical	fine-tuning.
Part of the asymmetry is due to the disruption in the import 
and export flows which will chiefly affect local areas relying 
on sectors with complex logistic chains. Industries such as 
the aeronautical and automotive ones require components 
from other European countries and they export a considerable 
part of their production to the continent. For instance, Airbus, 
which employs about 14,000 people in the UK, has repeatedly 
warned that it could relocate all of its activity out of the country 
if there is not a transitory agreement for Brexit.46 Rolls Royce, 
one of the major employers in Pendle, also announced that it 
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is considering moving part of its activity if the EU agreement is 
not satisfactory in the end.47 
The UK automotive sector employs 856,000, of which 186,000 
is in manufacturing.48 The Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders (SMMT) has also cautioned about an annual 
£2.7 billion increase in the cost of imports and £1.8 billion 
to exports of Brexit derived from a potential exit of the 
customs union.49 According to a report from LSE CEP, overall 
automotive production could fall 12% and the costs for British 
consumers increase 2.55%.50 SMMT also stresses that the 
vast majority of the UK’s automotive supply chain companies 
are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which may 
lack the resources to face the shock of a potential ‘no deal’, 
and that 39% of all employment in the British automotive 
sector is located in the Midlands, which implies a distinct 
regional impact.51 Other areas would also be affected. For 
instance, Nissan employs nearly 8,000 people directly and 
10,000 indirectly in the area of Sunderland. The Japanese 
manufacturer	has	also	notified	on	several	occasions	that	Brexit	
endangers the economic viability of its plant.52 
Brexit may also affect companies and consumers dissimilarly. 
For instance, the devaluation of the pound that followed 
the 2016 referendum helped some British exporters and 
contributed to a sense of moderate optimism which was 
captured in some of the interviews conducted.53 Conversely, 
that same devaluation is estimated to have cost each 
household £7.74 weekly due to higher consumer prices.54 Firms 
usually pass higher wages and imports costs on to consumers. 
Protectionist policies may contribute to higher wages but also 
47 Tovey A. 2018. Rolls-Royce mulls European move as Brexit deal worries grow. 
The Telegraph. 23 April. Available at:  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/04/23/rolls-royce-mulls-european-
move-brexit-deal-worries-grow/. 
48 SMMT. 2018. SMMT motor industry facts 2018. SMMT Driving the Motor 
Industry. Available at:  
https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/SMMT-Motor-Industry-
Facts-June-2018.pdf. 
49 SMMT also noted that 10% of the people employed in the sector in the UK 
are from other EU countries and that currently the UK automotive industry is 
having	problems	in	filling	about	5,000	skilled	jobs.	SMMT.	2018.	Brexit:	SMMT	
position. Available online at: https://www.smmt.co.uk/industry-topics/brexit/.
50 Dhingra et al. 2017b, 11.
51 SMMT. 2018. SMMT launches Brexit contingency aid package as high-risk auto 
suppliers brace for ‘no-deal’. 10 October. Available at:  
https://www.smmt.co.uk/2018/10/smmt-launches-brexit-contingency-aid-
package-as-high-risk-auto-suppliers-brace-for-no-deal/. 
52 Sunderland Echo. 2018. Nissan warns of hard Brexit risk to Sunderland plant. 4 
October. Video available at:  
https://www.sunderlandecho.com/our-region/sunderland/nissan-warns-of-hard-
brexit-risk-to-sunderland-plant-1-9379889.   
53	 Interviews	with	Sue	Kirk,	Financial	Director	of	Mansfield	Garage	Doors;	Keith	
Barnes, Packaging Consultant at K.B. Consulting; and Brian Stopford, Director 
of Stopford Associates, 24 May 2018.
54 Breinlich et al. 2017. Ibid, 9.
produce further inflation and the depreciation of the British 
pound after Brexit, and higher prices for British consumers.55 
The increase in wages may not be symmetrical; therefore while 
some	citizens	may	benefit	from	such	a	new	scenario,	many	
probably will not. 
A decline in immigration from EU member states is another 
of the expected outcomes of Brexit. Although there is a 
widespread perception that immigrants from Eastern Europe 
have driven down wages,56 research shows that this fall is 
associated with the 2008 crises and the slow economic 
recovery rather than immigration.57 On the other hand, most 
local	sources	consulted	in	the	five	local	areas	agree	that	the	
difficulties	recruiting	skilled	personnel	could	be	aggravated	with	
Brexit.58 The mismatch between skills demand and supply is 
associated with inadequate professional training and higher 
education provision and has been compensated, and to some 
extent masked, by the influx of foreign workers.59 In Pendle and 
Mansfield,	where	the	manufacturing	sector	is	very	important,	
engineering companies employ many Europeans. These areas 
are already struggling to recruit and retain skilled workers and 
the likely limits to free movement will probably exacerbate 
these problems. In particular, the shortage of skills Levels 4 and 
5 seems to concern businesses in those areas.60 Hence, the 
insistence of many local stakeholders in the need to invest in 
training and vocational education.
55 Dixon L. J. and Jo H. 2017. Brexit’s protectionist policy and implications for the British pound. International Journal of Financial Research, 8(4), pp. 7-22, 19-20.
56 For instance, interviews with Councillor Gordon Lishman, 31 May 2018; and Councillor Lord Anthony Greaves, 25 May 2018.
57 Wadsworth, J., Dhingra S., Ottaviano, G. and Van Reenen, J. 2016. Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK. CEP Brexit series: Paper No. 5, 16. Migration 
Advisory Committee. 2018. EEA migration in the UK: Final report.  September. Available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/741926/Final_EEA_report.PDF. 
58 The Edge Foundation. 2018. Skills shortages in the UK economy. Edge Bulletin 1. April. Available at:  
http://www.edge.co.uk/sites/default/files/publications/final_skills_shortage_bulletin_web_2.pdf.  
59	 Interviews	with	Martin	Rigley,	CEO	of	Lindhurst	Engineering;	and	Brian	Stopford,	Board	Member	of	Mansfield	and	Ashfield	2020,	24	May	2018.
60 See for instance, interviews with Miranda Barker, CEO of East Lancashire Chamber of Commerce, 28 June 2018; and Matthew Wheatley, CEO of Local Enterprise 
Partnership	for	Derby,	Derbyshire,	Nottingham	and	Nottinghamshire,	25	May	2018.	Similar	views	were	expressed	during	discussion	panels	in	Nelson	and	Mansfield	in	
January 2019.
61	 Royal	College	of	Nursing.	2017.	Safe	and	effective	staffing:	Nursing	against	the	odds.	UK Policy Report. September. Available at:  
https://www.rcn.org.uk/-/media/royal-college-of-nursing/documents/publications/2017/september/pdf-006415.pdf. Torjesen I. 2017. Four in 10 European doctors may 
leave	UK	after	Brexit	vote,	BMA	survey	finds.	BMJ: British Medical Journal, 356. Available at: https://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j988 
62 NHS Digital. 2018. NHS workforce statistics January 2018. 24 April. Available at:  
https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/nhs-workforce-statistics/nhs-workforce-statistics---january-2018.  
63	 The	recruitment	and	retention	of	staff	in	social	care	have	been	difficult	in	Barnet,	and	in	Southampton	the	proportion	of	non-British	EU	employees	is	declining	as	many	
leave and fewer are joining. Barnet Council. 2015. Barnet’s joint strategic needs assessment report. Available at: https://www.barnet.gov.uk/jsna-home. Shaw A. 2017. 
‘More EU staff quit Hampshire NHS Trust. The Southern Daily Echo. 16 October. Available at:  
http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/15597559.More_EU_staff_quit_Hampshire_NHS_trust/. 
64 Aberystwyth University. 2017. Financial statements for the year ending 31 July. Available at: 
https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/finance/pdf/2016-17-Financial-Accounts-(Eng).pdf 
65 Report from the University of Southampton to Commons Science and Technology Committee. 2016. Leaving the EU: Implications and opportunities for science and 
research. July. Available at: http://www.southampton.ac.uk/assets/sharepoint/groupsite/Administration/SitePublisher-document-store/Documents/About/impact/Brexit-
implications-for-science-and-research-inquiry-2016.pdf 
66 BBC News. 2016. 100 cancel Aberystwyth University places after Brexit. 15 July. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-36799951 
67 Betteley C. 2018. 100 jobs under threat due to university cuts. Cambrian News. 4 April. Available at: http://www.cambrian-news.co.uk/article.
cfm?id=120016&headline=100%20jobs%20under%20threat%20due%20to%20university%20cuts&sectionIs=news&searchyear=2018. 
The shortage of skilled labour in the NHS has been suggested 
by several studies so far.61 Brexit is already negatively affecting 
the expectation of current and prospective NHS workers. 
For instance, the proportion of NHS workers leaving during 
the	first	half	of	2017	was	larger	than	the	entire	2014-2015	
period.62 These problems were shown to be salient issues in the 
fieldwork	conducted	in	Barnet	and	Southampton,	both	hosting	
important hospitals.63 
The problem of attraction and retention of high-skilled 
students	and	academics	emerged	as	a	very	significant	
concern	during	the	Ceredigion	and	Southampton	fieldwork,	
each of them hosting two universities. Faculty members and 
university executives fear that the limitations to the freedom 
of movement to academics and students will affect education 
quality and reduce the appeal of their institutions as places 
to study and work. Internal reports from Aberystwyth64 and 
Southampton65	universities	show	that	financial	risks	associated	
with Brexit are likely going to negatively impact their business 
models. For instance, 12% of faculty members in Southampton 
University and 15% of students in Aberystwyth University come 
from other EU countries. After Brexit, students would start 
paying the much higher overseas fees, may see access to 
student	loans	limited	and	probably	would	have	to	fulfil	some	
legal requisites to have the right study in the UK. More than 
100 prospective European students withdrew their applications 
from this Welsh university immediately after the referendum 
result.66 Brexit may exacerbate existing problems.67 The effects 
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may be particularly severe for universities located in areas with 
a low density population and which do not have a very high 
position in higher education rankings, as they may struggle to 
attract enough students and scholars.68 The problems in the 
68 As Professor John Grattan, Aberystwyth University Vice-Chancellor, puts it, they ‘have no urban hinterland to recruit from’. Interview, 25 May 2018.
69 Savage M. 2017. Fears grow over EU university funding as grants decline even before Brexit. Observer. 3 December. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/dec/03/eu-university-funding-grants-decline-brexit-horizon-2020.  
70 European Commission Horizon 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/ 
71	 European	Commission.	2018.	Horizon	2020	in	full	swing:	Three	years	on:	Key	facts	and	figures	2014-2016.	Available	at:	https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/
sites/horizon2020/files/h2020_threeyearson_a4_horizontal_2018_web.pdf.	The	UK	is	the	first	recipient	of	H2020	grants	followed	by	Germany,	Spain,	Italy	and	France,	27.
72 Deloitte. 2017. Impact of Brexit on the manufacturing industry: Aerospace & Defence. Available at:  
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/manufacturing/deloitte-uk-brexit-ad-sheet.pdf 
education sector can have a ripple effect in local economies in 
places such as Aberystwyth, where the university accounts for 
nearly a third of the town’s residents. 
 
University researchers and business managers in the 
technology	sectors	affirm	that	Brexit	is	already	making	UK-
based institutions and companies lose R&D funding from the 
EU.69 Many are concerned with how Brexit will affect access 
to the Horizon 2020 programme which provides €30 billion 
for the 2018-2020 period.70 Although UK research institutions 
and	firms	have	traditionally	enjoyed	a	very	high	success	rate	
in obtaining EU grants,71 many British institutions are not 
competing for the latest funding opportunities as they believe 
their bids would be undermined by the situation, and even if 
they are successful they fear projects may be cancelled after 
Brexit. Britain’s prominent position as partner and supplier 
in the EU Defence project would be jeopardised and the EU 
Defence	R&D	programme	grants,	which	have	greatly	benefited	
the UK aerospace sector, could be denied in the future.72 Most 
of the current research grants will not be affected, but there 
are long-term projects for which funding is not being renewed. 
The UK government has announced that matching schemes 
will be created to compensate this gap. However, it is likely 
that the transition period necessary to replace R&D funding 
may	noticeably	harm	specific	organisations.	Southampton	
University could be one of them as it is the British higher 
education institution which relies the most on EU funding, with 
91.35% of its grant research income coming from the EU.73 
The uncertainties surrounding the replacement of the 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) is another 
key	challenge	emerging	in	Ceredigion,	Pendle	and	Mansfield.	
These funds include the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), Cohesion Fund 
(CF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF).74 
Although	current	ESIF	funding	is	confirmed	through	to	
2020 and regulatory requirements have in some cases 
disincentivised applications,75 the importance of these funds 
in local economic development has been stressed by several 
key local stakeholders.76 Many EU-funded programmes have 
helped	areas	which	suffered	difficult	industrial	restructuring	
processes	such	as	Mansfield	and	Pendle.	For	instance,	the	
Local Enterprise Partnership for Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham 
and	Nottinghamshire	(D2N2	LEP),	where	Mansfield	belongs	
administratively, has an allocation of €250 million of ESIF 
funding to spend during 2014-2020 on programmes supporting 
promotion of SMEs, digital business and services for 
unemployed people.77 European regional development funding 
has also contributed to several local regeneration projects in 
Mansfield.78 In Pendle, EU-funded initiatives, such as Boost 
Growth for Lancashire and Lancashire Skills and Employment 
Hub, provide assistance to SMEs and promote social inclusion 
and sustainable employment.
There are also doubts about the capacity of the central 
government to implement effective and coherent local and 
regional	policies	of	economic	development	and	fill	the	gap	
left by the EU. Many decades of these policies have failed to 
achieve a balanced distribution of economic activity.79 The 
73 Matthews D. 2016. Which universities would lose out from Brexit? Times Higher Education. 25 May. Available at:   
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/which-universities-would-lose-out-from-brexit#survey-answer.
74 For more information, see European Commission. European structural and investment funds. Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-programmes/european-structural-and-investment-funds_en.  
75 Interview with Councillor Joe Cooney, 1 June 2018.
76 Interviews with Andrew Leeming, Senior Programme Manager for Boost Growth Lancashire; and Dennis Mendoros OBE, Director of Euravia Engineering and Supply Co. 
and Chairman of Pendle Vision Board, 30 May 2018. 
77	 D2N2	LEP.	2017.	D2N2	annual	review	2016/17.	Available	at:	http://www.d2n2lep.org/write/D2N2_Annual_Review_2016-17.pdf. 
78	 HMGovernment.	Beneficiaries	under	the	East	Midlands	2007	to	2013	ERDF	programme.	Available	at:	 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479592/East_Midlands_List_of_Beneficiaries_Nov_15.pdf.
79 Martin Pike Tylerand Gardiner. 2016, 346.
80 Sandford M. 2018. Devolution to local government in England. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 07029. 4 May. Available at:  
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07029/SN07029.pdf. 
81 Huggins C. 2018. The future of cohesion policy in England: Local government responses to Brexit and the future of regional funding. Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, 
58, pp. 131-153, 135-137.
82 Interview with Matthew Wheatley, CEO D2N2 LEP, 25 May 2018.
83 Grant W. 2016. The challenges facing UK farmers from Brexit. EuroChoices, 15(2), pp. 11-16. Available at:  
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1746-692X.12127, 12.
abolition of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and 
their substitution by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), 
coupled with the process of devolution to local governments 
and a move towards city deals and combined authorities, 
make it challenging.80 The asymmetry of the system and the 
overlapping of functions and responsibilities can hamper 
these efforts. There are also doubts about the capacity of 
local authorities to influence such policies in the near future 
given that they have been to a great extent excluded from the 
management and oversight of EU funding, which has become 
increasingly centralised in England. Local authorities also face 
important	limitations	in	terms	of	fiscal	autonomy	which	were	
aggravated thanks to the austerity imposed after the global 
financial	crisis.81 Although criticised for being bureaucratic, 
EU regional development policies also have some advantages 
that must be taken into consideration in the process of 
replacement: they tend to be longer-term programmes, usually 
six or seven years, that provide continuity and are not affected 
by the fluctuations associated with British electoral cycles.82 
Finally, the impact of Brexit on EU farm subsidies would be non-
negligible and new ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ are likely to emerge 
in the process. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
not	only	made	significant	transfers	to	farmers	but	also	paid	
for the delivery of environmental services. Currently, there is 
considerable dependence on the Single Farm Payment Scheme 
(SFP) and other payments. For 2014-2015 these accounted 
for 56% of total income across all farm types and 60% of 
hill livestock producers.83 Although the British government 
has guaranteed the current level of subsidies until 2020, 
which could be extended until 2022, and Brexit presents an 
opportunity to redesign policies to better suit the UK, it is not 
clear what levels of support the British government will provide 
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beyond that period and how subsidies will be allocated.84 
Moreover, there is a risk that the withdrawal from the EU’s CAP, 
which provided generous subsidies, may produce a noticeable 
increase in food prices that will affect the working classes.85
Many farmers voted Leave expecting that after Brexit, the more 
restrictive and bureaucratic aspects of the EU health and safety 
regulations will be eliminated. For instance, in Ceredigion, a 
county with 75,000 inhabitants but which hosts approximately 
100,000 cattle and 885,000 sheep, Welsh farmers expressed 
their frustration with ‘red tape’ and particularly with the 
electronic tagging system for farm animals that the EU 
introduced. 86 Many of them believed that the reduction of lamb 
exports to the EU could be compensated by higher exports to 
other regions such as China and the Middle East, which could 
be fuelled by new bilateral trade agreements. 
However, the main farmer unions in Wales decided to support 
the Remain position as they are much more pessimist about 
the opportunities Brexit offers.87 No major such bilateral 
agreements have been formalised yet. Currently 72.4% of 
all Welsh food and drink exports go the EU markets, and 
approximately 92% of lamb exports. Moreover, Welsh farmers 
currently receive £250 million in direct payments from the EU’s 
CAP.88 The National Farmers Union warns that the scenario of 
‘no deal’ with the EU could have catastrophic consequences 
for the sector, the exports of which could be stopped for six 
84 Downing E. and Coe S. 2018. Brexit: Future UK agriculture policy. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, Number 8218. 31 January. Available at:  
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-library/Brexit-UK-agriculture-policy-CBP-8218.pdf. Swinbank A. 2017. ‘World trade rules and the policy options for British 
agriculture post-Brexit. UK Trade Policy Observatory Briefing Paper 7. Available at: http://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2017/01/Briefing-paper-7.pdf. 
85	 Interview	with	Jim	Burley,	LEADER	Programme	Officer	for	North	Nottinghamshire,	23	May	2018.	
86	 Farmers’	Union	of	Wales	(FUW)	data	from	a	2014	survey.	Interview	with	Charlotte	Priddy,	FUW	Policy	Officer,	25	May	2018.
87 FUW and National Farmers’ Union Wales (NFU).
88 Welsh Government. 2017. Welsh food & drink exports up by almost 20%. 12 July. Available at:  
https://gov.wales/newsroom/environmentandcountryside/2017/170711-welsh-food-drink-exports-up-by-almost/?lang=en. Williams J. 2018. From farm to fork: The future 
of Welsh lamb post-Brexit. BBC News. 6 June. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-44384751.
89 O’Carroll L. 2018. No-deal Brexit ‘would stop British farming exports for six months’. Guardian. 26 September. Available at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/sep/26/no-deal-brexit-will-be-catastrophic-say-british-farmers-national-farmers-union-eu.  
90 Forgrave A. 2018. Welsh farmers launch funding campaign in a £133m battle for ‘survival’. Daily Post. 8 March. Available at:  
https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/local-news/welsh-farmers-launch-funding-campaign-14386357. 
months.89 Additionally, even if exports and payments would be 
replaced, the period of transition at the level of regulation and 
calculation of new payments create many uncertainties. The 
new formula could disadvantage smaller and less dynamic 
farms and translate into an overall gap of £133 million per year 
for Wales.90 This could generate frustration among those who 
end up worse off than within the EU.
It is also worth noting that the relative optimism that was 
observed during the interviews in May 2018 in the areas with 
a wider support for the Leave option had been largely replaced 
by a more pessimistic stance among business people during 
the discussion panels we conducted in January 2019. The 
new general view was that uncertainty was already negatively 
affecting the local economy. For instance, recruitment and 
investment decisions were frozen until there was more clarity 
on what would happen after 29 March 2019. The expression 
‘let’s get on with it’ was several times used. Many business 
people expressed that they were more concerned with the 
current	uncertainty	than	with	any	specific	exit	scenario.	Even	
those advocating for an exit acknowledged that Brexit will have 
negative effects in the economy in the short term.
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Challenges ahead and concluding remarks 
A series of lessons can be extracted from this research which may help tackle 
the sources of discontent which motivated the Brexit vote, as well as the 
upcoming challenges derived from the actual process of separation from the EU.
91 Councillor Lord Anthony Greaves explained how ethnic lines currently impact local party dynamics in Pendle, 22 January 2019.
The Remain campaign was extremely weak in some of the 
areas with higher support for exiting the EU; however, other 
very important factors help explain the result of the vote. The 
Leave vote in the referendum was mainly driven by discontent 
with the current situation and nostalgia about a glorious 
British past. This discontent cannot be reduced to a single 
factor.	The	analysis	of	the	five	local	areas,	Barnet,	Ceredigion,	
Mansfield,	Pendle	and	Southampton,	against	the	backdrop	of	
the most relevant social science studies on Brexit, suggest a 
combination of ideational factors: chiefly attitudes towards 
globalisation, migration and identity, rooted in socio-economic 
and geographic structural characteristics. 
At the level of ideas, some segments of the population felt ‘left 
behind’ by those they considered to be ‘out of touch’ elites. 
They	perceived	that	globalisation	was	not	benefiting	everyone	
equally, and that they were not only on the ‘losing side’ but also 
had	lost	capacity	to	shape	their	future.	The	EU	was	identified	
as a driver of globalisation, and leaving the EU was seen as a 
way to limit the impact of this and ‘take back control’ of the 
situation. Although the percentage of migrant population in 
an area is not correlated with the Leave vote, negative views 
towards migrants and sudden increases in immigration 
rates are. Migrants were seen as the cause of lower wages 
and a threat to local identities. Ethnic divides are becoming 
increasingly visible in some areas and they are starting to 
impact local politics.91 Overall, national identities seem to have 
contributed	to	the	Brexit	result:	those	strongly	identified	with	
English nationalism were more prone to vote Leave, and those 
who	identified	with	Welsh,	Scottish	and	Irish	nationalism	leaned	
towards Remain.
Local economic features have contributed to create a 
‘geography of discontent’, especially in zones where 
regeneration	policies	have	failed.	Areas	such	as	Mansfield	
and	Pendle	suffered	a	difficult	industrial	restructuring	process	
after the collapse of the mining and textile industries. They 
have become increasingly dependent on an economic model 
based on low-skill and low-paid jobs, as well as on controversial 
business practices which instilled precariousness in the labour 
market and limited social mobility. In turn, these local dynamics 
have been stimulated and reinforced by the fact that these 
areas are geographically insulated from the main economic 
hubs. These towns are struggling to compete with bigger cities 
to attract talent and investment.
Therefore, the discontent linked to the ideational triad 
globalisation-migration-identity which caused the result 
of the 2016 referendum is, to a great extent, grounded on 
local structural socio-economic trends, which are shaped by 
geographical features too. The Leave vote can be construed 
as a sort of ‘revenge of the places that don’t matter’ and an 
attempt to disrupt the current political and socio-economic 
inertia by creating a critical juncture with the expectation that it 
will open a new path to prosperity. 
However, this new path is surrounded with uncertainties. 
Leaving the EU is likely not going to provide a long-term 
solution to most of the problems which triggered the Leave 
vote. On the contrary, it is likely that some of the areas which 
largely voted Leave would be worse off. The impacts of Brexit 
would be highly asymmetric and it has been argued that 
economically vulnerable citizens and areas are likely going to 
be hit the most. If exceptional measures are not taken, new 
‘losers’ will emerge in the post-Brexit scenario, and some 
of those who considered themselves today the ‘losers of 
globalisation’ may see themselves locked on an even  
worse path. 
Brexit is going to be overall negative to the economy, according 
to the large majority of academic and government studies. 
It seems that the regions of the UK are the most exposed 
compared to those in the rest of Europe, except for some in the 
Republic of Ireland. Several studies predict than within Britain, 
some areas will suffer considerably more than others. The 
real and perceived inequalities which are at the source of the 
discontent may persist or become aggravated. In the analysis 
of	the	five	local	areas,	several	factors	have	been	identified	as	
the main causes of concern in a post Brexit scenario: 
a) Exiting the single market may cause a disruption in the 
import and export flows due to the introduction of tariffs 
which are likely to very negatively affect industries such as 
the aeronautical and automotive ones, which require complex 
logistics chains and overseas customers. There are fears about 
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relocation of activities and job losses. Protectionist policies will 
likely produce an increase in food and other consumer goods 
prices, which would primarily harm the working classes. Most 
stakeholders consulted recommend that the UK Government 
makes the necessary arrangements to safeguard the trade 
links of local companies with the EU.
b) The decline in immigration, although one of the drivers 
of the Brexit vote, may aggravate the skill shortage in areas 
such as technology, health and higher education. British 
authorities would need to address the mismatch between 
skills demand and supply by promoting professional training 
and certain pathways in higher education. Special schemes 
may also be necessary to recruit and retain foreign high-skilled 
workers, who are currently essential in some sectors. For 
instance, the NHS and universities seem particularly exposed 
to	this	problem.	A	significant	percentage	of	nurses,	doctors,	
professors and students are European. Likewise, the food, 
warehousing, cleaning and care sectors would be negatively 
impacted by labour shortages.
c) The loss of European funding and payments raises concerns 
at several levels. The loss of R&D funding from the EU has 
started	to	negatively	affect	British	technology	firms	and	
universities, which have traditionally been very successful at 
attracting grants. Similarly, ESIF have underpinned many of 
the regional and local economic development projects and 
have been (very) important in rural areas and those which have 
undergone industrial restructuring. Moreover, British farmers 
are dependent on CAP payments. Although the UK Government 
has announced that all this funding will be matched, there are 
still many doubts about the process of replacement, redesign 
of the regulatory framework and the new criteria used for the 
calculation and allocation of funding which may create new 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
Three other ideas can be elicited from the analyses, interviews 
and discussions conducted during this research project. First, 
uncertainty does not only negatively affect the economy but 
also governance. The relative optimism that followed the 
referendum has given way to a situation of anxiety. The climate 
of ‘wait and see’ among local stakeholders is widespread and 
is already affecting investment and recruitment decisions. 
The plans to substitute the labour force, markets, investments 
and regulations, which are necessary to mitigate the 
abovementioned negative impacts, have not been clearly 
defined	or	communicated	properly	yet.	As	29	March	2019	
approaches, citizens and business seem to be expecting some 
answers and contingency plans from their local governments. 
However,	the	latter	are	expecting	some	clarifications	on	the	exit	
scenarios from Westminster before making decisions. 
Second,	regardless	of	the	final	scenario	–	either	‘hard’,	with	or	
without deal, ‘soft’ or ‘no Brexit’ – policy-makers in both London 
and Brussels may need to pay more attention to the local 
realities	and	specific	needs	of	those	who	live	far	from	the	big	
centres of political and economic power. The empowerment 
of local and regional stakeholders through the devolution of 
responsibility for policy design and implementation could help 
reduce some of the frustrations observed in particular among 
Leave voters.
Third, it is unlikely than most of the problems, real or perceived, 
underpinning the Leave vote will be solved by leaving the EU. 
Rational economic calculations have not weighed as much in 
the Brexit vote as discontent and emotions. Citizens were more 
aware of the problems associated with EU membership than 
of	the	benefits	this	arrangement	has	provided	to	the	UK	and	to	
their local communities. Most voters disregarded the evidence 
provided by economists and other social scientists. Many 
even developed a negative attitude towards them, who they 
accused of ignoring ordinary citizens and communicating only 
with	elites.	In	order	to	increase	the	impact	of	social	scientific	
evidence on society and influence citizens and policy-makers in 
the future, scholars may need to establish a more direct, fluid 
and reflective dialogue with them as this project has attempted.
discussion panels we conducted in January 2019. The new 
general view was that uncertainty was already negatively 
affecting the local economy. For instance, recruitment and 
investment decisions were frozen until there was more clarity 
on what would happen after 29 March 2019. The expression 
‘let’s get on with it’ was several times used. Many business 
people expressed that they were more concerned with the 
current	uncertainty	than	with	any	specific	exit	scenario.	Even	
those advocating for an exit acknowledged that Brexit will have 
negative effects in the economy in the short term.
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      View of the Mansfield market
  Immigration is an important source of skills-sharing in the aerospace 
 The Spires, one of the main shopping points in Barnet, situated on Barnet High Street
   Polish Shop in Southampton
Appendix
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Electorate in Brexit referendum Electoral Commission 223467 53400 77624 64534 158171 46500001
United 
Kingdom
Number of valid votes in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 161033 39742 56344 45335 107665 33551983
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting remain in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting leave in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for soft Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% -1.3%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for hard Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -2.2% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage of live births to mothers 
not born in the UK ONS 58.7% 11.1% 17.1% 28.9% 34.8% 26.9%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage non-British ONS 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3% United Kingdom
Percentage non UK born ONS 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1% United Kingdom
Percentage born in UK, 2011 2011 Census 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6% England and Wales
Percentage born in other EU 
countries, 2011 2011 Census 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
England and 
Wales
Percentage white UK born APS 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7% United Kingdom
Percentage white not UK born APS 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority UK born APS 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born APS 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0% United Kingdom
Employment share: Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing BRES 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Mining, 
quarrying & utilities BRES 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Manufacturing BRES 2.3% 4.2% 9.8% 28.1% 3.4% 7.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Construction BRES 6.1% 5.8% 7.3% 4.7% 3.0% 4.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Motor trades BRES 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Wholesale BRES 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 3.9% 2.6% 3.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Retail BRES 11.4% 10.0% 12.2% 10.9% 9.4% 9.5% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Transport & storage (inc postal) BRES 3.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 4.8% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Accommodation & food services BRES 6.8% 13.3% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 7.4% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Information & communication BRES 4.5% 1.3% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Financial & insurance BRES 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 3.5% Great Britain
Employment share: Property BRES 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Professional, scientific & technical BRES 11.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 8.7% Great Britain
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Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Employment share: Business 
administration & support services BRES 8.3% 2.0% 12.2% 4.7% 12.0% 8.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Public 
administration & defence BRES 3.4% 6.7% 4.3% 2.5% 4.3% 4.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Education BRES 11.4% 20.0% 8.5% 9.4% 12.0% 8.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Health BRES 15.2% 13.3% 14.6% 10.9% 17.1% 13.0% Great Britain
Employment share: Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other services
BRES 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 2.5% 3.8% 4.6% Great Britain
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, 
aged 16-64
APS 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4% United 
Kingdom
Percentage with no qualifications, 
aged 16-64
APS 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0% United 
Kingdom
Population, 2017 APS 389,700 74,800 105,800 89,700 250,900 65,114,500 United 
Kingdom
Social Mobility Index 
(ranking out of 324)
Social 
Mobility Index
9 Not 
available
315 144 247 Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
49.5% 11.0% 28.2% 47.2% 39.7% 36.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Labour
Electoral 
Commission
38.4% 9.7% 39.4% 34.9% 19.1% 30.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
5.5% 10.2% 25.1% 12.2% 12.8% 12.6% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
68.0% 69.0% 60.9% 68.8% 63.4% 66.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
47.1% 18.4% 46.6% 49.0% 42.8% 42.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Labour
Electoral 
Commission
45.2% 20.2% 44.5% 46.2% 47.7% 40.0% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
0.6% 1.5% 5.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
70.5% 73.3% 64.5% 69.0% 67.1% 68.8% United 
Kingdom
Price level, 2016 
(regional, relative to UK index of 100)
ONS 107.2 98.1 99.6 98.8 101.5 100.0 United 
Kingdom
House price, 2017 
(mean transaction price)
Land Registry £691,914 £224,337 £148,961 £114,441 £268,534 £345,715 England and 
Wales
Notes
Employment by ethnicity data is obtained from Nomis but is not included here due to space constraints
Electoral comission data for the EU referendum is available at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information
The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) paper is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf
The ONS migration data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom
Data from the Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are available at Noms: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
The Social Mobility Index is only available for England
ONS regional price data is available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/relativeregionalconsumerpricelevelsuk/2016 
House Price data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-data-downloads
Electoral Comission data for the 2015 and 2017 general elections is available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data/
electoral-data-files-and-reports
General election voting data is available at the parliamentary constituency level whereas this project focuses on local authorities. We impute local authority level data 
by	fitting	constituencies	into	local	authorities.	For	Ceredigion,	Mansfield	and	Pendle,	the	parliamentary	constituency	is	equivalent	to	the	local	authority.	Barnet	is	a	
combination of three parliamentary constituencies, namely: Finchley and Golders Green, Hendon, and Chipping Barnet. For these four local authorities there is no issue in 
obtaining local authority level general election data. Southampton is constructed of two full constituencies - Test and Itchen - and part of the constituency Romsey and 
Southampton North. To obtain general election data for Southampton, we use the population-weighted mean of the general election results for these constituencies. This 
requires us to assume that the voting behaviour of voters in the section of Romsey and Southampton North that is in the local authority Southampton is equivalent to the 
proportion that is outside of Southampton local authority. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption. Further, it only affects a 11.9% of the Southampton population, 
so any induced error is likely to be relatively very small.
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Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Hard Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Percentage decrease in local authority 
GVA: Soft Brexit (Dhingra et al. 2017)
Appendix 2: Post-Brexit estimated decrease of 
Gross Value Added (GVA) per local authority
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Appendix 3: List of interviewees
Barnet
Nik Haidar Director at Four23 Management
Sachin Patel Liberal Democrats campaigner
Nathan Wade Green Party campaigner
Adam Langleben Labour Party campaigner
David Webb Gardening business owner 
Hugh Jordan Local UNISON Representative
Two anonymous interviewees One academic and a local political campaigner
Twenty short interviews in the street (‘vox pops’) from a variety of perspectives
Ceredigion
John Grattan Professor and Pro Vice-Chancellor of Aberystwyth University
Peter Howell National Farmers’ Union Cymru
Huw Rhys Thomas National Farmers’ Union Cymru
Elin Jones Speaker of the National Assembly for Wales, Plaid Cymru
Ben Lake MP for Ceredigion, Plaid Cymru
Charlotte Priddy Farmers’ Union of Wales
Alun Williams Ceredigion Council and Cabinet, Plaid Cymru
Mansfield
Jim Burley LEADER Programme Officer for North Nottinghamshire
Dominic Wring Professor of Political Communication, Loughborough University
Martin Rigley CEO, Lindhurst Engineering
Brian Stopford Director, Stopford Associates; Board Member, Mansfield & Ashfield 2020
Keith Barnes Packaging consultant, K. B. Consulting
Sue Kirk Financial Director, Mansfield Garage Doors
Matthew Wheatley CEO, D2N2 LEP
Andy Done-Johnson Journalist, Sheffield Star
James Lowe CEO, Brightbuster
Ben Bradley MP for Mansfield, Conservative Party
Pendle
Wayne Blackburn Labour Councillor, Pendle Borough Council
Tony Greaves Liberal Democrat Councillor, Pendle Borough Council
Joe Cooney Conservative Councillor, Pendle Borough Council
Gordon Lishman Liberal Democrat Candidate 2017 General Election
Dennis Mendoros President Mendor Enterprises, former Owner of Euravia
Neil McInroy Chief Executive, Centre for Local Economic Strategy
Andrew Leeming Senior Project Officer, Lancashire County Council
Miranda Barker CEO, East Lancashire Chamber of Commerce
Dominic Collis Journalist, Burnley Express
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Southampton
Will Jennings Professor of Political Science, University of Southampton
Alan Whitehead MP Member of Parliament for Southampton Test, Labour Party
Ivan White Councillor Bitterne Park Ward, Conservative Party 
Andrew Pope Southampton Independent Party, Redbridge Ward
Denise Wyatt Redbridge Ward Council candidate for Southampton Independents at the 2016 local 
elections and Leader of Southampton Independents
Alan Fraser GMB Southern Regional Education Officer
Matthew Claisse Councillor Portswood Ward, Conservative Party
Neil McCullough Associate Director, Oxford Economics
Appendix 4: Participants in discussion panels
Barnet 28 September 2018
Ben Samuel Student and worker in the gardening sector
David Webb Owner of a gardening business, also part of Chipping Barnet for EU
Nik Haidar Director at Four23 Management
Dami Olatuyi Law student
Rashida Laca Retired social worker
Ouamar Madjid Owner of Patisserie Joie de Vie
Joelle Grogan Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University
Nelson, Pendle 22 Jan 2019
Steve Whitehead  CEO Training 2000 Limited
Alison Rushton Vice Principal Nelson and Colne College
Bill Jacobs Journalist, Lancashire Telegraph
Tony Greaves  Lord and Lib-Dem local leader
Mansfield 24 Jan 2019
Lee Anderson Councillor, Conservative Party
Helena Brothwell Principal, Queen Elizabeth’s Academy, Mansfield
Jim Burley The North Nottinghamshire LEADER Programme Officer
Richard Crisp Commercial Development Executive, Mansfield Building Society
Tony Delahunty Managing Director, Mansfield 103.2FM
Andrew Topping Journalist, The Mansfield Chad
Kath Jephson Managing Director (Owner), B Jephson (Mansfield) Ltd
Alex Peace-Gadsby Trustee, The Inspire & Achieve Foundation
Andy Done-Johnson Journalist, Sheffield Star
Sonya Ward Labour Parliamentary candidate, Mansfield Labour Party
Mark Higginbottom Mansfield & Ashfield 2020
Lynn Oxborrow Principal Lecturer in Small Businesses and Supply Chain in Nottingham  
Trent University
Graham Kirk Partner, Mansfield Garage Doors
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